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Dr David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, in his very 
recent book, Human Rights (1978; 42-3) alludes b r ie fly  to the socia l 
roots o f systems o f human rights in the following words (re ferr in g  to 
the Soviet Union): 'We must assert our Western values unhesitatingly - 
we should make i t  clear we shall not compromise. But vie must recognise 
that change involves human behaviour and that can come only by evolution. 
Behavioural change rarely comes rapidly and even when i t  does, i t  is 
either so vo la tile  that i t  only increases in s tab ility , or i t  carries 
the r ig id ity  that so often goes with conversion.' ( I t a l ic s  mine)
On Southern A frica , a fte r saying on page 92, 'Our task, i f  
we are to  remain true to our democratic and human values, is  to 
demonstrate beyond any shadow o f a doubt that democratic change can be 
brought about rapidly and effectively by peaceful means.' , he says on 
page 94 (2 pages la te r ) ,  'Change o f th is kind (towards a fu lly  democratic 
society in South A frica) will not take place overnight. We are 
attempting to transform human behaviour, to a lte r  prejudices and practices 
which have become ingrained in the last century and a h a lf . ' ( I ta l ic s  
mine)
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With some disturbing inconsistency, therefore, Dr Owen relates 
human rights to 'human behaviour' which may be 'in gra ined ', that is ,  
deeply rooted in socia l institutions which are resistant to moral 
persuasion. Unfortunately, Dr Owen does himself and his po lic ies  a 
disservice by using terminology which is  somewhat vague, general and 
unelaborated. The Black or Third World c r it ic  o f his arguments w i l l  
too easily  misread the quotes I have given above and see them as p a llid  
excuses fo r  se lf-in terested  British pragmatism. I f  po lic ies adopted by 
Western nations v is-a -v is  the non-Western world in the arena o f human 
rights are to have longer term thrust and balance and be convincing, the 
soc ia l, economic and p o lit ic a l preconditions fo r  human rights must be 
more clearly and precisely understood and more vigorously enunciated.
I t  often appears to me that the foreign policy rea lis ts  o f the West 
(both lawyers and po lit ic ian s ) are kept on the run as i t  were, and have 
'their stánces dislodged by very well-meaning moralists and id ea lis ts . This 
is both good and bad. I t  is  good fo r motivating a constant Western con­
cern for human rights in Southern A frica , but bad fo r  judgement, policy 
s ta b ility  and effectiveness. I f  Dr Owen is  right and mere moral
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exhortation cannot a lte r 'ingrained* socia l conventions, then, short o f 
coercion, the West must work for the emergence o f socia l conditions 
conducive to democracy and human rights.
Some lawyers, steeped in the tradition o f current lib e ra l 
lega l philosophy, have understandable d if f ic u lt ie s  with arguments about 
the socia l foundations o f human rights. For them, much o f the sociology 
o f law seems too antiform alistic , detracting from what is  called the 
'd ign ity  o f law' or appearing to dissolve law into broader concepts like 
'soc ia l con tro l', 'so c ia l order' or even 'norms*. I t  is  not my intention, 
however, to  negate the independent force o f a lega l tradition  in the 
struggle fo r human rights. Following the Weberian trad ition , I w i l l ,  at 
a la te r point, emphasise the importance o f that system o f institu tionalised 
and codified  values and norms, embodied in an authoritative modem 
'es ta te ' (the lega l profession and its  enterprise) which one may c a ll 
the d is tin c tive ly  lega l. In so doing I w i l l  attempt to assess how in­
flu en tia l and autonomous the lega l tradition can be in a hostile  societa l 
environment; and also attempt to consider how the autonomy and independent 
force o f the lega l estate may have come to ex ist.
Any explication o f the socia l foundations o f  human rights is  
rea lly  an account o f why and how the modem democratic state has come to 
ex ist. Needless to  say, th is history has been complex and therefore th is 
discussion must perforce be superfic ia l.
Human rights are part o f what may be called 'democratic 
responsiveness' in a society; the type o f interplay o f forces and struc­
tures out o f which an open franchise and the protection o f c iv i l  
lib e r t ie s  can emerge. There is  a range o f necessary conditions fo r  the 
emergence o f democratic responsiveness, suggested by the social history 
o f Western society, no single one o f which is a su ffic ien t condition by 
i t s e l f .  These conditions w i l l  be discussed below, in the ligh t o f Western 
history, in no particular order o f importance. ( I  should note that I 
am not unaware o f the fa ilin gs  o f modern democracy. I t  is ,  however, a 
useful starting point in the analysis.)
1) Universalist Values and Non-Conformist Religion
Religious tolerance was in many ways the precursor o f wider 
freedoms. A particu larly important event for Britain was perhaps the 
con flict between viewpoints which raged a fter the defection o f Henry V II I ,
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a period o f co llec tive  uncertainty which created basic conditions 
favourable to religious tolerance. More generally, however, the 
Reformation, in asserting the notion o f a l l  men as a single society - 
the body o f Christ - raised the dignity o f the common man. A ll men had 
souls and a l l  men shared an essential unity, the 'c it y  o f man' in the 
image o f  God. (See, fo r example, Troeltsch, i960) This e ffe c t was re­
inforced by Calvinism and Puritanism, both o f which stressed the 
independence o f church from state, introducing an important 'pluralism ' 
in moral authority. This division o f status protected influences on the 
religious ' l e f t '  which would have been suppressed in a state church 
(Jordan, 1932-1940) These developments brought fo r  Northern European 
history a v ita l era in which non-conformists began to be tolerated in the 
societa l community.
This was a re lig ious movement o f high intensity and fervour, 
carried by individuals o f impeccable socia l and moral credentials, even 
marked asceticism, who were capable o f great sa cr ific e . Their great 
'resp ec tab ility ' gave them p o lit ic a l protection. Sim ilarly non-conformist 
movements o f a p o lit ic a l nature would have been a direct threat to the 
states o f the day and probably suppressed.
What was important about these movements was the resultant 
pluralism o f authority - the fragmentation o f moral power in society 
and the precedent o f the acceptance o f non-conforming socia l groups.
Third World development can hardly duplicate this process, since religious 
conversions o f the same type by the same sort o f highly respected citizenry 
are unlikely. Marxism-Leninism or various kinds o f  Socialism are per­
haps equivalent to relig ious conviction but these movements aim d irectly  
at p o lit ic a l power and i f  and when successful tend to establish or 
enforce a formal coincidence between state ideology and popular b e lie f-  
systems as well as the exclusion o f non-conformists from the societa l 
community. I t  is highly unlikely that the world w il l  soon again ex­
perience a movement with such powerful social consequences as the 
Reformation and the emergence o f the protestant eth ic in Europe.
2) The Breaking o f Centralised Authority by New Influence Groups: Power 
and Status D ifferentiation________________________________________________
Unlike, say, France, where even a great revolution fa iled  to 
establish democracy in the short run, England and Holland provide us
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with another example o f a precondition for the emergence o f democracy. 
Whereas France had an aristocracy which was highly dependent on the 
central royal house, in England this aristocracy was diffuse and became 
a separate constituency o f power with great status. The same can be 
said o f the ' gentry'.  The authority and leverage o f both was under­
pinned by the ir vigorous involvement in an agricultural market economy. 
In Holland the same status and influence was achieved by powerful 
merchant groups in urban communities, coherently organised and emerging 
as a strong p o lit ic a l constituency. In both countries these 'in te r­
mediate1 leve ls  o f influence helped to challenge and fragment the 
centralisation o f power. (For fu lle r  discussion see Parsons, 1971)
In th is situation o f re la tive  power pluralism, other 
institu tions, lik e  the lega l system, were able to benefit and increase 
the ir leverage in society. Lawyers became a mediating 'in terfa ce ' 
in the course o f the ir involvement in commercial and land transactions, 
which very often involved protecting the rights and priv ileges o f 
individual noblemen, traders or farmers. In Germany, according to 
Dahrendorf (19 ) lega l evolution took a somewhat d ifferen t course with
the rule o f law (Rechtstaat) becoming established without i t  rea lly  
o ffe r in g  protection to individual lib e rt ie s  in c iv i l  matters.
In his The Idea o f Law, Lloyd (1964-) discusses the possible 
role o f law in society. While he concedes that lega l prescription 
in con flic t with prevailing community values and socia l forces is  a 
'dead l e t t e r ' , he argues that law and the legal profession under 
certain circumstances can become a powerful directing force. These 
circumstances were favourable in North Western Europe before the 
emergence o f democracy; as an authoritative agency standing between 
con flicting parties i t  acquired the status to begin to express the 
universalistic values o f the Roman-European lega l trad ition , with very 
good e ffe c t .
What these arguments suggest is  that power and status 
d ifferen tia tion  in society is  an important precondition fo r  human 
rights and democracy. This d ifferen tia tion  need not involve an 
intermediate aristocracy or landed gentry; i t  could be any organised 
socia l force which enjoys some economic autonomy forming a dynamic 
balance. More often than not in the previous emergence o f democratic
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forms this balance has been achieved by a d iversity o f e lite s  unable 
to dislodge each other.
In many, i f  not most third world countries, economic under­
development has meant that the educated or economically successful 
e lite s  are a small component in the society. In A frica particu larly , 
the struggle against colonialism and the e ffo r ts  o f colonial powers 
to co-opt trad itiona l e lite s  both unified the modern e lite s  o f 
businessmen, professionals and c iv i l  servants and weakened the tr ib a l 
chiefs. The formation o f liberation-oriented parties and movements 
tended to make the power-elite in the emergent states monolithic.
Not that there has not been e l i t e  competition, but the disaffected or 
countervailing leaders o f  regional groups, r iv a l constituencies or 
particu lar interest groups have not had the resources or economic 
independence to  res ist or balance the influence o f the dominant central 
e l i t e ,  usually bolstered by a one-party state bureaucracy. Hence 
economic underdevelopment is  accompanied by organisational under­
development^ most o f these societies simply have not had the balance 
o f organisations, elite-groupings and d ifferen tia tion  o f economic 
interest groups to provide a balance to  the central power structure.
Under these circumstances, even would-be independent professionals and
academics a l l  too often have been sucked into the power-ambit o f the 
central web o f power and administrati a.
Eisenstadt (1970) very cogently gives one view in what he 
ca lls  the dissassociation between e lite s  and the broad social strata 
in the society as a factor in the breakdown o f modernisation. There 
is  also what von der Mehden (1964; 72-3) refers to  as the 'one-party 
captivity o f the c iv i l  service ' - the absence o f the balancing or 
constraining influence o f a p o lit ic a lly  neutral, dedicated c iv i l  service, 
leading to misuse o f administrative power. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to state 
with c la r ity  whether the one-party system captures the bureaucracy or 
vice-versa - the e ffec ts  could be broadly the same. Lofchie (1370) 
quotes a summary o f authors given by La Palombara suggesting the la tte r , 
in the sense that'a  strong bureaucracy in many o f the new states tends 
to inh ib it the growth o f strong executives, voluntary associations and 
other p o lit ic a l institutions essential to viable democratic government' 
(p27Q). As Lofchie's analysis proceeds, however, i t  appears that his 
broad assessment o f the African situation is that the unsupervised,
6.
pervasive and inevitably increasingly corrupt bureaucracy helps weaken, 
or coincides with weakened, representative structures - parties, 
voluntary associations and the lik e . The top echelon o f the p o lit ic a l 
e l i t e ,  the personalistic ’ leader' or ’ cabinet autocracy' (Lo fch ie ’ s 
terra) leaves planning and administration to the bureaucracy and in 
turn in a sense, is  l e f t  to i t s  own devices, pursuing symbolic goals 
o f legitim isation  o f its  own regime and creating the conditions fo r  
its  continued popularity (which can easily  include terroris ing p o lit ic a l 
opponents). Here Mazrui (1970) adds a dimension to th is understanding 
with his assertion o f the ’ monarchical tendency’ in African p o lit ic a l 
leadership - arising out o f the sp ir itua l basis o f trad itiona l ru le, 
the need to  reassert dignity and esteem in the face o f rac ia l humiliation 
(o r continuing underdevelopment) and the need to symbolise national 
identity in new, very often ethnically heterogeneous societies.
Democracy and human rights cannot survive or develop in such 
decidedly asymmetric power and organisational arrangements. De Schweinitz 
(196U; 10) says: ’ I f  the state is non-democratic, as i t  is  lik e ly  to 
be in impoverished so c ie t ie s , the growth process w i l l  not throw up 
those autonomous centers o f power and pressure which in the previous 
century acted as vehicles fo r p o lit ic a l reform.’ The outlook fo r 
democracy in the third world is not favourable in the short to medium 
term,
3) A Minimum o f Basic Value Consensus or the Need fo r Popular 
Legitimacy o f Government_______________________________________
I t  was important for the development o f democracy that Europe 
emerged slowly from Feudalism under conditions that generally favoured 
the increasing welfare o f the common man. Feudalism had tigh tly  pre­
scribed the status and influence o f various classes and estates and 
although there were outbreaks o f discontent, the socia l gradings were 
generally so pervasive that the sense o f protest was blunted. Europe 
had a generally favourable climate and people did not normally l iv e  in 
semi-famine (unlike many parts o f the third world). The growth o f large 
market centres, trading and small-scale production prior to the in­
dustrial revolution provided some outlet for the aspirations o f the 
g ifted , energetic and sk illed . Most important o f a l l ,  there was no 
alternative model o f mass wealth and affluence - the priv ileges o f the 
e lite s  were legitimated by aristocra tic  myths. The resu lt, very 
broadly and very oversimply stated, perhaps, was that expectations
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did not outrun a growth in welfare. In Britain, when certain 
privileged  'commoner' classes had obtained some access to power, a 
tradition  o f democratic reform could become established before very 
serious threats to the s ta b ility  o f the public order could emanate 
from the emergent industrial working classes during the early in­
dustrial period. This trad ition , established in an ea r lie r  period o f 
'contained' protest and low expectations among the masses, formed a 
mould fo r  the subsequent emergence o f wider r igh ts . Franchise rights 
and other c iv i l  lib e r t ie s  were extended as a means o f protecting that 
trad ition  without the threat o f the socia l order being overwhelmed by 
mass-expectations: the society had become su ffic ien tly  d ifferen tiated  
to avoid a destructive elite-mass confrontation. (For a very fu l l  
discussion see de Schweinitz 1964.)
History no doubt provides many contradictions and exceptions 
but i t  does seem that in Britain , to take an exemplary model o f the 
emergence o f democracy and human righ ts , the evolution o f ever-widening 
participation and citizen  protection was not threatened by the 
articu lation o f mass emotion at toe early a stage. In France, the 
revolution had permitted this and then soon a fter contained and re­
pressed i t  under the Jacobin dictatorship (equipped with the now 
fam iliar rationalisations o f the 'General W i l l ' ) .  In other words, 
however a r t i f ic ia l  and constrained i t  might have been, England had the 
benefit o f an effective minimum consensus, or at least an effective 
absence o f highly threatening mass discontent.
The third world situation is  markedly d ifferen t. F irs t ly , 
the welfare o f the masses is  more often than not stagnant - the e lite s  
may be increasing 5.n welfare but low growth, the inappropriate spread 
o f growth and high population increases leave the masses o f the 
popuJ.ation in a semi-famine situation. Secondly, western-oriented 
academic education as w ell as the knowledge through the media o f 
mass affluence elsewhere has created a sense o f high re la tive  deprivation. 
Thirdly, the wealth o f the e lite s  is legitimated normally only by 
education, or power or very new symbols, not by the pervasive myths o f 
royal, a ris tocra tic , or genteel status, as in post Feudal Europe.
Fourthly, the societies are re la t iv e ly  undifferentiated - there is  no 
gradation o f classes (Upper, Upper-middle, Middle, Lower-middle, 
'Respectable Poor', Poor, e tc . ) as there was in 19th century Europe.
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These factors combine to present many third world societies with a 
situation o f latent mass-elite confrontation. In my own experience, 
the partly educated son or daughter o f a subsistence farmer in Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana or Zambia tends to have much higher 
aspirations than even the present-day son or daughter o f a tradesman 
or small farmer in many parts o f Europe. Demonstration e ffec ts  from 
the developed world have been alluring and powerful in A frica. Often the 
basic consensus about the system in A frica is very tenuous and to a 
lesser or greater extent coercion protects the socia l order. The 
acceptability o f government is  further undermined by the presence 
o f a corrupt and unsupervised bureaucracy referred to in the previous 
section. A major point is  that, due perhaps to  the time o f the 
emergence o f  new states - the era o f welfare capitalism and socialism 
- the p o lit ic a l culture stresses welfare norms in the new states before 
the economy has generated su ffic ien t resources to meet these demands.
(See Lofchie, 1970)
The establishment o f a coerced or a r t i f ic ia l  consensus over 
time (perhaps legitim ised by African Socia list slogans and b e lie fs , and 
a genuine growth in mass welfare ( i f  that occurs) w i l l  slowly erode 
this c r is is  o f popular legitimacy. Once again, however, on this score 
the prospects fo r  short to medium term improvements in p o lit ic a l 
freedoms in developing A frica are auspicious, to say the least.
4) Basic Attitudes to Conflict
In his Society and Democracy in Germany, Dahrendorf (1967) 
variously mentions the need in a democracy fo r a tradition  o f rational 
con flic t regulation. What is  perhaps required is  a co llec tive  experience 
o f the way in which in ter-party, inter-group or inter-class con flic t 
can be channelled, regulated and rationally resolved within a frame­
work acceptable to  both parties. This rational approach to con flic t 
regulation requires that con flic t is  seen to be inevitable, meaning that 
the form o f control rather than the elimination o f con flic t becomes 
emphasised, and that contending parties are lik e ly  to adhere to  the 
rules o f negotiation and settlement.
In the new states o f A frica , there is  perhaps so much necessary 
emphasis on the need fo r  national unity and in the absence o f strong 
legitimacy fo r government, on the need to maintain the appearance o f
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consensus, fo r con flic t to be acknowledged and accepted. The p o lit ic a l 
culture which prevails hence contains no normative alternative to the 
repression o f dissent.
5) Individualism
Weber, in his well-known thesis The Protestant Ethics and the 
Spirit o f Capitalism (1930) and The Protestant Seats and the Spirit o f  
Capitalism (1970) gave the by now oft-repeated analysis that 
Protestantism in general and the Puritan sects in particular produced 
a powerful s p ir it  o f individualism, related to the notion o f proving 
oneself before God and proving oneself among men. The notion was not 
one o f conforming among men but holding one’ s own - competing - and 
simultaneously showing more obedience to God than man. This s p ir it ,  
which naturally spread beyond Protestantism in Western societies 
represented a radical break from 'patriarchal and authoritarian bondage' 
o f the s p ir it  into cap ita lis t individualism (1948; 321). What was 
important fo r  democracy was the emergence o f a sp ir it  aversive to 
socia l and p o lit ic a l authority.
In A frica , the involvement o f the Christian Church in socia l 
matters has been didactic, educational, moral and economic as has 
b e fitted  the gross socio-economic problems o f the region. Conversion 
from 'paganism’ has had to precede the fin er nuances o f Christian ethic. 
Also the syncretism o f traditionalism  and Christianity in the separatist 
sects and the paternalism o f the typ ical priests and ministers in 
A frica are far-removed from the sp ir it  o f individual responsib ility to 
God. In Africa there is  l i t t l e  immediate prospect o f the emergence o f 
the bourgeois individualism o f Europe which was so v ita l  for the 
emergence o f democracy and c iv i l  lib e r t ie s . The point should be noted 
that in Brita in , fo r example, the middle class bourgeoisie and the higher 
classes had established the p o lit ic a l corollary o f individualism, la issez- 
fa ire  liberalism , as a prevailing p o lit ic a l doctrine before the masses 
were enfranchised. (Lofch ie; 1970; 282) Perhaps A fr ica 's  mass- 
enfranchisement has produced strains and demands which the seed-bed 
societies o f democracy in Europe never had to endure.
6) Public Values
Dahrendorf (1967; passim) emphasises the importance o f another 
tradition  in a democracy, that o f the prevalence o f  what he ca lls  'public
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virtues ' as opposed to ’ private values'. Particu larly true o f Anglo- 
Saxon society, public values place a premium on propriety. He mentions 
fa ir  play in sport as one small example o f public virtue. Public 
virtues are the roles people play within a trad ition  aimed at minimum 
fr ic tion  between people and groups. Public virtues are superficia l 
but lead, Dahrendorf says, to contractual r e l ia b il it y .  People hide 
the ir ethnic preferences. I t  is  a fin e ly  cultivated socia l tradition 
which one can hardly expect o f A frica where ethnic passions and the 
private delights o f status, power and wealth are more openly (more 
honestly) expressed, to the detriment o f the kind o f socia l order 
appropriate to mass-participation and tolerance.
7) Priv ileged  Non-Conformist Humanist In tellectuals
Weber (Gerth and M ills ; 1970; 71-7*+) expresses a profound 
pessimism about the prospects fo r one precondition for the emergence 
o f freedom repeating in se lf in new societies. His concept o f 
charisma included a type o f personality which was able to transcend 
the routines o f everyday institutions and escape from established 
defin itions. Avowedly 'e l i t i s t '  his yeast o f freedom was a propertied 
or p riv ileged  and highly educated humanist - mandarins in China, 'gen tle­
men' in ea r lie r  England, French 'cava liers ' and Ita lian  ' cortegiano'.
This in te llectu a l was courageous, confident, iconoclastic. Today, in 
developed societies and in the third world, this type o f in te llectu a l 
is on the defensive against the cap ita lis t 'expert' and the bureaucrat 
planner, against compulsive executives and dogmatic Marxists or 
soc ia lis ts . Technology and centralised power, the tempo o f production 
and the desperate race fo r development makes Weber's charisma redundant, 
and with i t  a v ita l  i f  subtle component o f the trad ition  o f freedom.
8) Education
The leve l o f education has very frequently been associated 
with the aptitude fo r democracy and freedom in society. De Schweinitz 
(196|4; 23-26), however, makes a c r it ic a l d istinction between tech­
niques and substantive values in education. The la t te r , he says, 
impart to individuals a sense o f the ir own importance to the community 
and the ir rights to the priv ileges o f participation. I t  is therefore 
the 'in t r in s ic ',  not the instrumental aspects o f education which are 
important, and the sense o f independence i t  conveys.
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Education as a very important source o f freedom can be 
questioned in the wake o f the Nazi era in Germany, but any socia l 
survey yie lds results which show the better-educated to be more 
tolerant and humane and less authoritarian than others. A frica , with 
low leve ls  o f lite racy  le t  alone advanced education, has a patent 
disadvantage. One must add, as w e ll, that education which is  approached 
single-mindedly as a means o f achieving a good job, status and 
esteem, which emphasises rote-learning and 'r e s u lts ',  and which is  ac­
knowledged to be the preparation fo r  white-collar roles in bureaucracy 
is  severely attenuated in terms o f de Schweinitz's criterion .
9) The 'Fear o f Freedom* and the Crisis o f Africa
Erich Fromm (1960; Ch.II and I I I )  argues cogently that 
processes o f change and modernisation in the la te medieval era 
weakened trad itional t ie s  and id en tit ie s , leaving men fee lin g  alone, 
isolated and insecure. The Reformation and Calvinism were strongly 
compensatory, with deep ly-fe lt in trins ic  fa ith  playing a compensatory 
ro le . Yet this relig ious sp ir it  also freed men; i t  contained no new 
bondage o f sacred authority and convention. Today, Muslim populations 
(Iran ) and doubtless populations in Africa find themselves emotionally 
dislocated by change. The small, clique-like separatist religious 
groupings o f A frica , the conventions o f Islam, perhaps o ffe r  Africans 
the same compensations, but without the individualism o f deeply 
personal responsib ility to God.
As already indicated, Weber, mindful o f this kind o f develop­
ment, said 'the h is to r ica l origin  o f modern freedom has had certain 
unique preconditions which w ill  never repeat themselves.' (Gerth and 
M ills , 1970; 71)
We cannot depend on the strength o f the socia l bases o f 
freedom in the West. As Fromm (1960; 218 passim) said in the fo rties  
already, a new conformity coincident with corporate and monopoly 
capitalism and the mass-media society is emerging - the conformity 
induced by automation, systematization and anonymous public opinion. 
('O ther-directed ' versus the ea r lie r  '.inner-directed’ man.) Fromm 
also points out that the freedom o f individualism was a freedom o f 
abundance (I960; 250); a condition not possible in a situation o f
want.
12.
Developing A frica , plagued by want, by the insecurities o f 
change, over-systematised by the superimposition o f modern, developed 
capitalism, technology and planning can be forgiven fo r  ’ escaping from 
freedom' into mass-nationalism, personality cults and non-democratic 
forms o f government and socia l control. Europe also had the advantage 
o f the emergence o f an early 'n a tion a lity ' before the strains o f in­
dustrialism and modernisation, which may even have extended to family 
planning (de Schweinitz, 1964; 245); in A frica a very trad itional 
(pre-medieval?) society was usurped f i r s t  by colonialism and then by 
forced modernisation. In the USA and in Europe, the ea r lie r  socia l 
revolutions had paved the way fo r  'constitutionalism* as a commonly 
desired safeguard o f individual lib e rt ie s  (a t least fo r  some) before 
the crises o f industrialisation (Parsons, 1971; 93, passim). For 
A frica, as Lofchie (1970; 281) points out, the sudden liberation  meant 
that at least four h is to r ica l 'c r is e s ' that Europe and the West 
endured singly and sequentially are trag ica lly  superimposed: the 
crises o f id en tity , legitim acy, participation and distribution.
10) A Passing Comment fo r  Africa
John Rex (1974; 206) says that 'the fru its  o f "liberation " o f 
man from ea r lie r  forms o f socia l order are now evident in the bru­
ta l i ty  and anarchy which more and more we take fo r granted.'
I t  is not appropriate to despair or to blame or presecibe in 
a sp ir it  o f moral arrogance, but, as Rex says, to 'take the true 
socio log ica l measure o f the ta s k ... ' Western aid and foreign policy 
must be based on an understanding o f why freedom has fa iled ; an 
understanding particu larly o f the imbalances within developing societies 
and the lack of cross-cutting and constraining forces.
This understanding must complement the hope fo r  'innovative' 
solutions to p o lit ic a l development from Africa. (See Spiro, 1967, Ch. 5) 
Spiro gives cogent reasons fo r this hope, which I would express as 
follows: the fact that 'African Nationalism ' has balanced parochial 
and chauvinistic id en tity , humanistic formulations o f p o lit ic a l 
ideologies (African Socialism, One Party Democracy e t c . ) ,  regional 
independence, a sense o f so lidarity  in the Organisation fo r African 
n ity , and the sheer energy and interest in p o lit ic s  as a means to  the 
realisation  o f the desirable.
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While there is  room fo r the expectation that African p o lit ic s  
may be innovative in form, i t  would be foolish to expect meaningful 
popular participation and human rights in the fu l l  sense in even the 
medium term future. Furthermore, some o f the hope has been pinned on 
terminology rather than process. Zambian ’ Humanism’ or Ujamaa in 
Tanzania are sophisticated modern and humanistically inspiring formu­
lations o f p o lit ic a l programmes. These are fra g ile  instruments, 
however; i t  is the patterning o f organization in the societies that 
counts, fo r  A frica as i t  has fo r  Europe. Europe and the West is not 
morally superior to A frica ; i t  simply had the right ingredients at the 
right time. Instead o f moral prescription, these ingredients must 
be studied.
11) The South African Case: A Plural Society
I t  has been suggested, then, that freedom or oppression is 
not simply the result o f good or bad intentions but rather the conse­
quence o f what tradition  and structure allow. Can the same be said o f 
a ’ p lura l' or race society like  South Africa?
I t  w il l  have been evident that most o f the problems o f black 
Africa are the problems o f South A frica as w ell. South A frica 's  
Afrikaners imported the essential features o f the protestant s p ir it  
o f individual responsib ility and lib erty  but th is s p ir it  underwent a 
change in the harsh environment o f the fron tier society and became 
what Hoodie (1974) has called a 'c i v i l  r e lig io n ',  inextricably in ter­
twined with the p o lit ic s  o f group survival and group imperialism.
The fie rc e ly  free French Huguenot tradition  has a l l  but vanished into 
a state-church trad ition .
While there are and always have been potentia lly strong 
p o lit ic a l interest groups like  big business, fo r example, in whose 
interest i t  would be to have black people gradually integrated, the 
greater anxiety posed by overwhelming black numbers taking over p o l i t i ­
cal control en tire ly (the danger o f a 'compact black majoritj^') has 
inhibited the emergence o f forces to balance those represented by the 
white p o lit ic a l e lite s . Here the plural nature o f the society has 
prevented the fragmentation o f power within the white group. Blacks 
in turn could theoretica lly  provide a countervailing node o f power
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through organised labour but, quite apart from rigorous suppression, 
the black working class is too insecure in a surplus labour economy, 
and also hitherto has been unable to master the extremely 
d if f ic u lt  problem o f organization and mobilisation which the situation 
requires. The Same broad assessment can be made fo r black p o lit ic a l 
movements.
In white party p o lit ic a l a c tiv ity , the ethnic divisions 
between English and Afrikaans-speaking voters, over the past 20 years 
and at important times before, ensured the Afrikaans group o f a 
compact majority o f voters with party loyalty founded on ethnic 
grounds rather more than on policy issues. The opposition parties, 
at the moment largely English-speaking, have a demographic ce ilin g  to 
the ir voting support which renders them almost irrelevant to the p o l i t i ­
cal process. The more relevant con flicts  over policy issues occur 
yytthin the dominant white ethnic party, but in these con flicts many 
o f the more c r it ic a l human rights issues a ffecting the majority are o f 
minor consequence.
Because o f its  ethnically plural structure, therefore, the 
opposing p o lit ic a l forces and interest groups are completely unbalanced: 
the country has what is  tantamount to a one-party state or single-party 
dominated state, based on tr ib a l allegiance, that one may encounter 
elsewhere in the third world.
The whites' 'id en tity  c r is is ' in this plural society has been 
formulated as one o f minority-group survival, fo r which power-dominance 
has been seen as essential. Combined with race discrimination o f a 
more fam iliar va r ie ty , this has created a perceived need to plan for 
the complete p o lit ic a l and institu tiona l separation o f whites from 
blacks, and in turn to a further need to fragment blacks ethnically 
to fo re s ta ll the ultimate p oss ib ility  o f a compact black majority. To 
the extent that these attempts, under the aegis o f Separate Development, 
have fa iled  to win black support the prospect o f such a compact black 
p o lit ic a l majority in the future remains very rea l.
A p o lit ic a l e l i t e  in an ethnically homogeneous society would 
most probably have taken a d ifferen t course- the 's tra tegy ' (probably 
not deliberate) o f fragmenting the unenfranchised majority economically,
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socia lly  and p o lit ic a lly  through selective mobility and co-optation 
into the system, as was the case, broadly, in European p o lit ic a l 
h istory. The fundamentally ’ ethnic* definitions o f p o lit ic a l issues 
in a plural society have prevented th is .
These defin itions, plus the very large co llec tive  anxieties 
created by the symbolism o f 'blood p o l i t ic s ',  have slox^ly eroded certain 
traditions which are essential bases o f human rights and democratic 
freedoms. These trad itions, like  those o f the colon ial constitution- 
makers fo r independent A frica , are extraneously derived from South 
A frica 's  h is to r ica l roots in and links with Britain and the West. The 
lib era l in te llectu a l trad ition , the trad ition  o f the rule o f law, the 
tradition  fo r p o lit ic s  to  be class-based rather than ethnically based 
(as in the old Cape ’ qualified* franchise), academic freedom and free­
dom o f the press and speech, have a l l  withered in the essentia lly 
d ifferen t p o lit ic a l climate o f a plural society. Traditions and 
values must be founded in indigenous structures in order to survive. 
Lloyd's views given ea r lie r  are apposite.
F inally, one other feature has helped to erode traditions 
supportive o f  human rights. Dahrendorf (1967; 79-82) isolates one o f 
the many features o f Nazi Germany leading to the de-humanisation o f 
certain m inorities, as the notion o f the 'untermensch' (the person not 
worthy o f human sympathy), and Fromm (1960; passim) argues that sado­
masochistic tra its  in the inhibited, insecure and demoralised lower- 
middle classes in H itle r Germany made large segments o f the population 
more than w illin g  to countenance persecution. I would argue that a 
plural society, in which one has a situation o f 'nations within a 
nation ', d iffe ren tia lly  priv ileged  or 'developed' and in competition ere' 
ates images o f the less-'developed' outgroups akin to  that o f the 
'untermensch'. Couple th is with the insecurity and anxiety o f a pre­
dominantly lower-middle class white society under pressures akin to  a 
's ie ge ' then sadistic tendencies must appear. The perceptions and 
predispositions created by a highly conflicted plural society are ugly 
and to ta lly  inimical to  the sp ir it  o f human rights.
12) ' Remedies' fo r South Africa
Democratic freedoms depend on balances o f in terest, cross­
cutting ties  and iden tities  and b u ilt-in  constraints to the free
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exercise o f power and coercion. To the extent that moral and economic 
pressures on South African white p o lit ic s  can operate as a con­
straining influence, and provide some additional bargaining power to 
blacks i t  is  an obvious strategy. To the extent that i t  may demoralize 
whites and increase anxieties beyond the type o f threshold that Germans 
crossed in the th ir t ie s  i t  would be disastrous. Pressure must be used 
very w isely. No one should expect South African whites to respond to 
moral persuasion simply because they themselves claim to be heirs to 
Western trad itions; they are the products o f a completely d ifferen t 
h is torica l set o f structures.
Most basica lly , the 'remedy' fo r  the lack o f human rights and 
democratic freedoms in South A frica probably lie s  in the follow ing:
a) the most rapid emergence possible o f the preconditions fo r 
genuine basic consensus across race groups as fa r as material and 
welfare benefits are concerned - the system as i t  comes to ex ist must 
be seen as benign; worthy o f fundamental loya lty . This requires reform 
in wages, welfare and services, on an emergency basis;
b) the encouragement o f as much genuine and accepted d ifferen tia tion
within the would-be 'compact' black majority as possible as a short-term 
p r io r ity : Greater opportunities fo r  occupational mobility and
variations in l i fe s ty le  fo r  blacks w il l  achieve th is most readily and 
most acceptably. This is  perhaps the highest immediate p r io r ity  o f a l l .
In the ligh t o f the ea r lie r  discussion, an extension o f the 
franchise to a l l  on a unitary basis at this stage may possibly achieve 
only retribu tive ju stice. There would be too l i t t l e  to  constrain a 
majority black government to ensure both the rights o f minorities and 
the health o f the system o f representation. A universal franchise is 
an ideal to which a l l  who belong to the common society should s tr iv e , 
but its  prospects o f maintaining democratic rights and freedoms in the 
longer-run would be dubious i f  i t  were introduced under present 
structural conditions. Of course there should be very meaningful 
p o lit ic a l reform as soon as possible but i t  would probably be best fo r 
rights in the future o f the country i f  this reform were based on 
federal or consociational forms o f government, with a great deal o f 
decentralisation o f power (not on the basis o f race). The ideal would 
be a constitutional form which builds into the system cross-cutting 
cleavages and a dynamic balance o f regional in terests, and which also
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gives weaker groups constraining powers, even i f  i t  includes a veto 
r ig h t;
c) the rapid p o lit ic a l development o f black constituencies, including 
the development o f leadership, so that the fu l l  variety o f black 
interests and attitudes is  projected through the media. Blacks whose 
views are projected at this stage are either those co-opted by the 
state, whose views everyone knows are unrepresentative, or the most 
motivated and progressive blacks whose allegiance to the unitary 
democratic principles o f ’ winner take a l l '  tend to discourage p o lit ic a l 
reforms that whites might otherwise concede. There i s , in fa c t , fa r 
greater d ifferen tia tion  in popular black p o lit ic a l views than the 
media would suggest (Hanf, et a l . , 1978, Ch.9-11). Black p o lit ic a l 
development would bring this healthy variety to the surface o f 
public debate and assuage many o f the anxieties which inhere in the 
rac ia lly  divided society.
These suggestions w il l  be seen by many as anti-progressive.
A ll I am trying to do, however, to use Rex’ s words quoted e a r lie r , is 
to ’ take the true socio log ica l measure o f the ta sk ', as I  see i t .
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